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in a dishonest manner. The nonresident
lawyer's professional duty and interest in
his reputation should provide the same incentive to maintain high ethical standards
as they do for resident lawyers." Piper, 105
S.Ct. at 1279. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire "has the authority to discipline all members of the bar, regardless of where they reside." Piper, 105
S.Ct. at 1279. Third, the argument that a
nonresident attorney will not be available
for court proceedings is unsound because
in those cases where the nonresident
counsel will be unavailable on short
notice, the State can protect its interests through less restrictive means. The
trial court, by rule or as an exercise of
discretion, may require any lawyer who
resides at a great distance to retain a
local attorney who will be available for
unscheduled meetings and hearings.
Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1280.
Fourth, the contention that nonresident
lawyers will not "do their share ofpro bono
and volunteer work" is not necessarily
true. Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1280. A nonresident lawyer could be "required to represent indigents and perhaps to participate
in formal legal-aid work." Piper, 105 S.Ct.
at 1280.
Justice Rehnquist dissented in Piper, arguing that there are substantial reasons
why a state would discriminate against
nonresident lawyers. First,
the State has a substantial interest in
creating its own set oflaws responsive
to its own local interests, and it is reasonable for a State to decide that those
people who have been trained to analyze law and policy are better equipped
to write those state laws and adjudicate
cases arising under them. The State
therefore may decide that it has an interest in maximizing the number of
resident lawyers, so as to increase the
quality of the pool from which its lawmakers can be drawn.
Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1283.
Second, since lawyers play an important
role in the formation of state policy, "they
should be intimately conversant with the
local concerns that should inform such
policies." Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1283. Third,
the state may have an interest in having
resident attorneys "bring their useful expertise to other important functions that
benefit from such expertise and are of interest to state governments-such as trusteeships, or directorships ofcorporations or
charitable organizations, or school board
positions, or merely the role of the interested citizen at a town meeting." Piper,
105 S.Ct. at 1283. Fourth, a state does

have a substantial interest in assuring that
there not be a delay in litigation due to
nonresident lawyers. Piper, 105 S.Ct. at
1285.
The Court in Piper has promulgated a
rule which will cause the amendment of, if
not the abolition of, residency requirements for lawyers in at least twenty-seven
states. The fears of Justice Rehnquist,
however, do not seem to be sound. Nonresident lawyers have represented clients,
with the permission of the courts, on a pro
hac vice basis for years. By allowing attorneys to practice on a regional or national
level, this ruling will permit the public to
have a freer hand in selecting competent
legal counsel.

-Sam Piazza
California v. Carney: A MAN'S
MOBILE HOME IS NOT
HIS CASTLE
In Calzjornia v. Carney, 105 S.Ct. 2066
(1985), the Supreme Court of the United
States held that federal narcotics agents
did not violate the fourth amendment
when they conducted a warrantless search
based on probable cause of a mobile home
parked in a public parking lot. In so doing,
the Court, for the first time applied the
"automobile exception" to a fully mobile
motor home.
Federal narcotics agents had reason to
believe that Carney was exchanging marijuana for sex in a motor home parked in a
lot in downtown San Diego. The defendant
was observed downtown as he approached
a youth and accompanied him back to the
motor home. When the youth emerged he
was stopped by the agents who then learned
that he had received marijuana in return
for allowing Carney sexual contacts. The
officers persuaded the youth to return to
the motor home and knock on the door.
When Carney stepped out the agents identified themselves and without a warrant or
consent, one agent entered and observed
marijuana and drug paraphernalia. A subsequent search of the motor home at the
police station revealed additional marijuana.
After unsuccessful attempts to have the
evidence discovered in the motor home
suppressed, the defendant pleaded nolo
contendre to possession of marijuana for
sale. The California Court of Appeal affirmed (People v. Carney, 117 Cal. App.
3d 36, 172 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1981)), but the
California Supreme Court reversed People
v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 597,194 Cal. Rptr.
500, 668 P.2d 807 (1983), holding the
"automobile exception" inapplicable to a
motor home.

Chief Justice Burger, author of the
Court's opinion, began by reviewing the
"automobile exception" to the general rule
that a warrant must be secured before a
search is undertaken. Carney, 105 S.Ct.
at 2068. This exception to the warrant requirement had its genesis in Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The
Court justified the lesser degree of protection of privacy interests in an automobile
by relying principally on the ready mobility of the automobile.
"However, although ready mobility
alone was perhaps the original justification
for the vehicle exception, our later cases
have made clear that ready mobility is not
the only basis for the exception." Carney,
105 S.Ct. at 2069. Because one has a lesser
expectation of privacy in one's automobile
than one's home, the warrant requirement
is relaxed notwithstanding the mobility of
the vehicle. Cady v. Dombrowskl~ 413 U.S.

433 (1973). "These reduced expectations
of privacy derive not from the fact that the
area to be searched is in plain view, but
from the pervasive regulation of vehicles
capable of traveling on the public highways." Carney, 105 S.Ct. at 2069.
The Court was now forced to characterize the motor home as either an automobile or a home. "While it is true that the
[defendant's] vehicle possessed some, if
not many of the attributes of a home, it is
equally clear that the vehicle falls clearly
within the exception laid down in Carroll . .. " Carney, 105 S.Ct. at 2070. The
Chief Justice noted that the motor home
was readily mobile and subject to extensive regulation-the two justifications underlying the "automobile exception."
However, the Chief Justice made a third
observation; "the vehicle was so situated
that an objective observer would conclude
that it was being used not as a residence,
but as a vehicle." Id. at 2070. This may
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represent an additional requirement imposed on the warrantless search of "hybrid"
vehicles-those combining "the mobility
attribute of an automobile ... with most of
the privacy characteristics of a house." Id.
at 2071 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Further
evidence of this additional requirement
may be found in a footnote to the Court's
opinion. "We need not pass on the application of the vehicle exception to a motor
home that is situated in such a way or place
that objectively indicated it is being used
as a residence." /d. at 2071 n.3.
Having concluded that the "automobile
exception" applied, the Court was left to
decide whether the search was reasonable.
"U nder the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement' [0]n1y the prior approval
of the magistrate is waived; the search
otherwise [must be such] as the magistrate
could authorize.'" Id. at 2071 (quoting
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823
(1982». The Court concluded that the
search was one that the magistrate could
authorize and was thus reasonable.
Before Carney, the lower court decisions
represented a potpourri of theories on the
applicability of the "automobile exception"
to motor homes. As a preliminary matter,
the courts have found difficulty distinguishing among motor homes, vans, campers, pick-ups with tops, and other similar
vehicles. State v. Francoeur, 387 So.2d
1063 (Fla. App. 1980). Substantively,
while the Ninth Circuit held that the
"automobile exception" is inapplicable to
a motor home, United States v. Williams,
630 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 865, (1980); United States V.
Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 918, (1982), other circuits
applied the "automobile exception" to
28- The Law
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motor homes, camper vans, and other such
vehicles. See United States V. Combs, 672
F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,458
U.S. 1111 (1982).
Furthermore, even among those courts
applying the "automobile exception" there
was disagreement as to when the exception
applied. Compare United States V. Rolland, 740 F.2d 878 (11th Cir. 1984) (exception applied to motor homes which are
used for transportation purposes and not
as dwellings) with State V. Francoeur, 387
So.2d 1063 (Fla. App. 1980) (exception
applied to camper van, even if "the defendants were using the vehicle as a living
accommodation" ).
Justice Stevens was joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall in dissent in Carney.
The dissent chastised the majority, claim-

ing that "[m]uch of the Court's 'burdensome' workload is a product of its own aggressiveness [in the fourth amendment
area, burdening] the argument docket with
cases presenting fact bound errors of minimal significance." Id. at 2072 (Stevens, J"
dissenting). On the merits, the dissent
characterized the Court's opinion as erroneous in three respects; "it has entered
new territory prematurely, it has accorded
priority to an exception rather than to the
general rule, and it has abandoned the limits on the exception imposed by prior
cases." Carney, 105 S.Ct. at 2071 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
Despite the dissent's suggestion that
"some conflict among state courts on novel
questions of the kind involved here is desirable as a means of exploring and refining
alternative approaches to the problem", id.
at 2073 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting), the
majority has opted for a uniform rule.
When the United States Supreme Court
interprets the Federal Constitution the
state courts are bound by that interpretation. Of course, state courts may choose to
rely on their own constitutions, giving
more protection under the state counterpart. See State V. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d
673 (S.D. 1976).
Although the defendant in Carney contended that the California Supreme Court
decision rested on adequate and independent state grounds, the Court rejected that
contention. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2068 n.l.
Whether, on remand, the California Supreme Court will continue to hold the
"automobile exception" inapplicable to
motor homes, this time on state grounds,
remains to be seen.
- Edward B. Lattner

WHY YOU ARE IMPORTANT TO US
Chances are you could playa vital role in the improvement of this magazine.
You see, unlike most legal journals, Law Forum is open to input and contributions
from all ambits of the legal community. Because we serve practitioners, professors,
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JOIN THE
SPECIAL OLYMPICS
TEAM!
AN

SPONSOR
ATHLETE!

Your tax-deductable contribution will make it possible for Baltimore County Special Olympics (E.C.S.O.) to provide a sports
program for mentally retarded children and adults in Baltimore
County. Sponsorship ofa Winter Games athlete allows E.C.S.O.
to send an athlete to the State Winter Games at Wisp Ski Resort
in McHenry Maryland from February 9-12, 1986. Sponsorship
ofa Spring Games athlete will permit E.C.S.O. to provide track
and field competition for an athlete at the Baltimore County
Spring Games at Catonsville Community College on May 10,
1986. (Note: Any moneys raised in excess of expenditures will
be used to provide services to athletes during the following
athletic year.)

For more information, call Sharon, E.C.S.O. Fundraising
Chairman, at (301) 521-5166.
Please make checks payable to Maryland Special OlympicsBaltimore County.
Send all correspondence to:
Baltimore County Special Olympics
c/o Michael Czarnowsky, Area Director
Department of Psychology
University of Maryland Baltimore County
Catonsville, Maryland
21228

Sponsorship Chart

Athletic
Competition

Full
Sponsorship

Half
Sponsorship

Quarter
Sponsorship

Winter Games
Spring Games

$90.00
$20.00

$45.00
$10.00

$23.00
$ 5.00

SPECIAL OLYM PIGS
Created by The Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. Foundation.
Authorized and Accredited by Special Olympics, Inc. for the Benefit of Mentally Retarded Citizens.
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America's Oldest Office Products Centers

OFFICE PRODUCTS CENTERS

OFFICE FURNITURE CENTERS

Annapolis, Baltimore, Towson, Pikesville, Salisbury

In Baltimore Call: (301) 799-7700
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In ~hington, D.C. Call: (202) 621-1002
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